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I. Types of companies
There is, as in most EU-legislations, a formal division of corporations in German law between
stock corporations or "Aktiengesellschaften" ("AG") and private limited companies
("Gesellschaften mit beschränkter Haftung" or "GmbH"). AG and GmbH are governed by
different acts, the Aktiengesetz (Stock Corporation Act)
1 and the GmbH-Gesetz (Limited
Liability Companies Act)
2, although some basic principles of corporate law apply equally to
both types. The division between stock corporations and limited liability companies does not
refer to the size of the company - there are large firms in the form of a GmbH and small,
family-owned corporations in the form of an Aktiengesellschaft. Only shares of a stock
corporation, however, can be listed and traded on a stock exchange. The stock corporation
rather than the limited liability company is the suitable legal form especially for large publicly
held firms with widely distributed ownership. Currently there are more than 700,000 limited
liability companies (GmbH) as compared with about 4,200 stock corporations. Of the latter
about 700 are listed on the stock exchange. That means that most stock corporations are also
privately-held. The following report refers to the stock corporation only.
II. Sources
The basic law on stock corporations, the Stock Corporation Act 
3, is supplemented by other
acts such as the Codetermination Acts, the Commercial Code with its rules on the commercial
register, accounting and other issues, or the Securities Trading Act (with its provisions, inter
alia, against insider dealing). The most important self-regulation for publicly traded
companies is the Takeover-Code of 1995.
4 There is, however, no self-regulation (a "code of
best practice") or a semi-official report concerning corporate governance comparable to the
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1    Aktiengesetz of Sept. 6, 1965 (Bundesgesetzblatt).
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      the form of the publication of May 20, 1898 (Reichsgesetzblatt, 846).
3    See footnote 1 ), supra.
4    Übernahmekodex der Börsensachverständigenkommission beim Bundesministerium der Finanzen, revised as
      of Nov. 28, 1997.
5    American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations, 2 vols., St.
      Paul, 1994.
6    Report of the Committee on the Financial  Aspects of Corporate Governance („Cadbury Report“),
     London 1992; Directors` Remuneration. Report of a study Group („Greenbury Report“), London 1995.4
III. Specific features: Two-tier system and co-determination
A specific feature of German corporate law is the separation between a management board
("Vorstand") and a supervisory board ("Aufsichtsrat"). This two-tier board system dates back
to the 1870's. This separation is mandatory for stock corporations and large limited liability
companies. The management board consists of inside directors only and manages and
represents the company as will be described in more detail below. The supervisory board has
the task of appointing and supervising the management of the company. It is exclusively
made up of outside directors; members of the management board cannot serve as members of
the supervisory board and vice versa. As tasks and duties of the members of the management
and the supervisory board are different, these two types of board will be dealt with separately
in what follows.
A further specific feature of German corporate law, the co-determination regime, relates to the
supervisory board. This will also be described in more detail below
11.
IV. Functions and powers of the management board
1. Appointment, dismissal, salary
The members of the management board are appointed, at most for five years, by the
supervisory board and may be dismissed by it, though only for cause
12. Reappointment is, of
course, permissible. Remuneration for management board members is also fixed by the
supervisory board. Performance-oriented pay is traditionally tied to figures derived from the
annual statement of accounts (like the annual surplus); only recently have market-oriented
instruments like stock options caught on.
                                                                                                                                                                            
7    Conseil National du Patronat Francais – CNPF: Le Conseil d‘ Administration des Sociétés Cotées,
      Paris 1995.
8    Fédérations des Entreprises de Belgique (FEB): Recommendations pour le bon fonctionnement du conseil
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11   VI. 4., below.
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2. Composition and tasks
There may be a chairman or speaker of the managing board. If so, he will not have the
position of an US-style CEO or a French PDG (he can neither hold the seat of a chairman of
the supervisory board nor can he decide against the majority of the management board's
members
13).
The management board represents the company in its business dealings and legal affairs
14.
In a central rule (§ 76) the Stock Corporation Code states that the management board "directs
the company under its own responsibility". This rule has a double meaning: First, it reserves
the task of actual management of the company's affairs, especially its day-to-day business,
exclusively to the management board. Although the supervisory board must monitor the
management
15, "management tasks" cannot be left to the supervisory board
16. The
shareholders' meeting is also restricted to taking basic decisions
17; it may decide on regular
management issues only at the request of the management board
18.
3. Stakeholders' interests
Second, the leeway which is given to the management by § 76 AktG allows and even obliges
it to take the interests of other "stakeholders" like the employees, the creditors of the firm and
the general public into account. There is a discussion in German legal literature about whether
the company is an "enterprise" with all interested groups such as employees, shareholders,
creditors and others as "stakeholders", whose interests management must pursue
19. But even
those who do not skate on this ice agree that the management is not obliged solely and
exclusively to pursue the interests of the present shareholders. There is no duty to maximise
the value of the shares; management may and must take the interests of the employees,
creditors, and the community at large into account. Management has, on behalf of the
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15   § 111 (1) Stock Corporation Code.
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17   § 119 (1) Stock Corporation Code.
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company, to act as a "good citizen". It may for instance, make donations to a university even
though its competitors could profit from the research there. It may make provisions for
employees about to lose their jobs even if there is no benefit from this for the company
because it is about to cease trading as a result, say, of a merger with another company or a
shutdown.
4. Groups of companies
§ 76 Stock Corporation Act is also applicable in groups of companies. The management board
of a subsidiary may not follow instructions or take measures which are not in the interest of
the subsidiary and cannot or likely will not be compensated by the holding company
20.
Different rules apply only if there exists a specific agreement between the subsidiary and the
holding company which provides, inter alia, for compensation of the subsidiary's shareholders
and protection of its creditors
21.
V. Control devices
1. Market forces and regulatory supplements
Modern microeconomic and legal theories see managers as "agents" and the owners (or the
"stakeholders") in a firm as their "principals". This separation between principals and agents
may lead to specific problems such as
- traditional conflicts of interests, as, for example, unfair self-dealing;
- shirking of managers whose effort cannot be observed; and
- positional conflicts - these may occur in a great variety of ways: among other
measures, managers can make it particularly difficult to monitor their performance,
impose high barriers to their own removal, seek to increase corporate size and so
on
22.
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There are of course market forces which help to reduce these problems like pressure from the
various factor markets (product, capital, labor) as far as these are competitive, monitoring by
creditors and competition in the market for managers. These market mechanisms will not -
except for some remarks on the so-called "market for corporate control"
23 - be treated in the
following. In any event market forces alone cannot safely redress the aforementioned
problems. Hence various devices have been developed to support and supplement the market
forces to help align the interests of the management with those of the stockholders, employees
and creditors of the firm. The main ones are:
- incentives in contracts, with the compensation of managers tied to their performance;
- monitoring of the management by the supervisory board and by auditors. The
institutional device "supervisory board" will be described in more detail below (VI.);
- personal civil liability of directors;
- rules of procedure and disclosure in corporate law and provisions against criminal
behavior in penal law.
Certainly, not all of these devices have the same objectives. The liability rules, for example,
are more concerned with misbehavior such as self-interested conduct by management, rather
than with monitoring managerial efficiency. The following remarks will be confined to
describing briefly these liability rules and their place in the German corporate governance
system
24. Further parts will then deal with the composition and functions of the supervisory
board and the “market for corporate control”. A section on recent legislation concludes.
2. Liability of managing directors
The practical importance of directors' liability under German law seems to be limited: Court
decisions are comparatively rare, albeit with an upward tendency in recent years. But liability
disputes between directors and their companies may well be settled outside the courtroom,
and the relative lack of court decisions does not say anything about the preventative function
of such rules. The director of a company is, apart from cases of tort, legally liable to his
company under the following conditions:
                                                       
23    VII, below.
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(i) breach of a contractual or statutory duty owed to the company;
(ii) that this breach occurred either intentionally or negligently; and
(iii) that this has caused damage to the company.
At least in theory German law differentiates between the breach of a (contractual or statutory)
duty and the question whether the director has acted negligently. In practice however, both
aspects reduce in most cases to one question, that is, how a prudent and diligent manager
would have acted. That is an objective and comparatively high standard. Directors need not
take all possible care but more than the usual care that might be expected of an ordinary man.
A director will also not succeed with the defence that he has acted with such care as he would
apply in his own affairs.
Common law systems use to differentiate between the "duty of care" and the "duty of
loyalty". German law also knows - at least in practice, as was mentioned before - a "duty of
care" and a duty of loyalty (Treuepflicht). The range of the fiduciary duties developed by, for
instance, the English law system seems however somewhat wider and more developed than its
German counterpart
25. The Federal Civil Supreme Court has also only recently explicitly
acknowledged a business judgement rule with its corresponding judicial self-restraint
26.
The enforcement of directors' duties by the shareholders themselves is rendered difficult by
German law. Vis-à-vis its managing directors a stock corporation is represented by its
supervisory board
27. This includes the power to commence an action against a wrongdoing
director in the company's name. The problem with this solution is that very often in the case
of fault of the managing directors, the supervisory board could equally be blamed for not
having fulfilled its monitoring tasks correctly. Hence the supervisory board will normally be
reluctant to take action against the members of the management board. Recently the Federal
Civil Supreme Court held however that the supervisory can even be obliged to sue
management
28.
The single shareholder does not have the right, apart from specific situations in groups of
companies, to bring a (derivative) action against the management on behalf of the company.
                                                                                                                                                                            
       German law, Int´ Company and Commercial Law Review 9, 1996, 318 ff. with further references.
25    Cf. the detailed comparative report by Abeltshäuser, Leitungshaftung im Kapitalgesellschaftsrecht, 1998.
26    Bundesgerichtshof 21.4.1997, Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 1997, 883, 885 f.
27    On the supervisory board sub. VI., below.
28    Bundesgerichtshof, 21.4.1997 (n. 26 supra).9
According to § 147 Stock Corporation Act, the majority of shareholders in a general meeting
can decide that the management be sued either by the supervisory board or by special
representatives. Furthermore this paragraph provides that a minority with at least 10 per cent
share of the company's capital can demand that the supervisory board or a special
representative take action against managing directors. The problem here is, of course, the high
threshold of 10 per cent of the equity capital. In big companies that can mean that one would
have to hold or bring together shares with a nominal value of a three-digit million DM
amount. Another problem is that the shareholder(s) who bring this action will have to bear all
the costs and expenses of the other party and the company should the action be dismissed.
Recent legislation has eased suing management.
29
VI. Composition and functions of the supervisory board
1. Tasks
The two main tasks of the supervisory board have already been mentioned: It appoints and
dismisses the members of the management board, and it supervises management. The
meaning of "supervision" should however not be misunderstood as allowing or even ordering
interference with the company's day-to-day business. Under the by-laws of the company or by
decision of the supervisory board certain categories of transactions may be subjected to the
supervisory board's prior approval.
2. Size
The supervisory board or Aufsichtsrat consists of at least three members and at most 21
members, depending on the stated capital of the corporation. The average Aufsichtsrat has
about 13 members.
30 One person can hold up to ten seats on supervisory boards of other
companies, the average number being 2-3 seats per person.
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3. Appointment and remuneration
The members of the supervisory board are appointed by the shareholders' meeting with the
exception of the representatives of the workforce in firms under a co-determination regime
31.
The influence of the management board on the process of selection of its supervisors is
difficult to assess. It depends on the legal form (codetermined firms and other), the
composition on the shareholders' side (widely distributed holdings vs. closely held firms) and
whether the members of the management board themselves have considerable shareholdings
on their own. All members of the supervisory board are outside directors in that they may not
serve on the management board of the same firm at the same time, and that the shareholders'
representatives usually work only part-time in their capacity as supervisory board members
for the firm. They are elected for a term of between four and five years
32.
The remuneration for the supervisory board members is fixed by the general meeting of
shareholders. The average pay is rather modest
33.
4. Firms under a co-determination regime
There are three different systems of labor participation on corporate boards
34. The one-third
participation model for corporations with more than 500 employees; the full-parity model for
coal and steel companies; and the quasi-parity codetermination for corporations with more
then 2,000 workers.
Under the "Industrial Constitution Act" (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz) of 1952, one third of the
members of the supervisory boards of stock corporations and limited liability companies with
more than 500 employees is appointed by the employees and two thirds by the shareholders.
The clear majority of voting power is hence held by the shareholders' representatives, putting
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the employees' representatives in a mere counselling position. In firms (corporations and
limited liability companies) in the mining and steel industries with more than 1,000
employees, the supervisory board consists of at least eleven members (up to a maximum of
21, depending on the size of the firm). On boards with 11 members five are appointed by the
employees (of them, three by the unions), five are elected by the shareholders, and a further
"neutral" member (with a casting vote) is appointed by the majority of both sides of the
supervisory board.
The third model is based on the 1976 Co-determination Statute. In corporations and limited
liability companies outside the iron and coal industries with more than 2,000 employees, half
the members are elected by the shareholders; the other half is elected by the employees and
the trade unions. For instance, in a firm with not more than 10,000 employees shareholders
will elect six, the employees (blue and white collar as well as lower-ranking management)
four, and the trade unions two members, the highest number of all members on the board of
the biggest firms being 20. If there is a stalemate in a vote by the board (a rare event), the
chairman, who is elected by the shareholders rather than by the employees, has a casting vote.
Because of this slight superiority of the shareholders this model is usually described as "quasi-
parity co-determination". In practice however, this tie-breaking vote is rarely used, for
pushing through important decisions in this way would worsen relations between
shareholders, management and the workforce well beyond the supervisory board.
The economic effects and impacts on corporate performance have been discussed
extensively
35. Although theoretically disputed and frequently considered as detrimental for
corporate performance, practice has come to terms with co-determination, and it is presently
not questioned by any side in German politics.
                                                       
35    Cf. Baums/Frick, Co-determination in Germany: The Impact on the Market Value of the Firm, Economic
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       bestimmung und Shareholder Value, Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft, 68, 1998, 453 ff; Sadowski,
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5. Representation of banks
An even more widely noted and, at the same time, widely critized, phenomenon of the
German system of corporate governance is the role of the banks in the system
36. German
banks, in particular the four or five biggest, own sometimes quite large equity stakes in
numerous public companies, they control the proxy machinery of most public companies
where there are not otherwise controlling shareholders, and they are represented on the boards
of most large German public companies
37. An overview has, for instance, shown that the three
Grossbanken (Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, Commerzbank) held 37 positions, or about
16% of the approximately 231 positions reserved for the stockholders on the supervisory
boards of the 24 nonfinancial industrial companies comprising the DAX 30 (the leading index
of German publicly traded "blue chip" companies)
38. But it would be overstated to contend
that these firms are bank-dominated. Factors which mitigate the influence of banks are the co-
determination regime and personal interlocks among all publicly-held firms. A relatively
small number of individuals (approximately 45) control more than one-half of the positions
available for equity representatives (288) on the boards of the DAX 30 companies
39. Hence it
cannot be said that the banks alone numerically dominate the supervisory boards. A stronger
case can be made that a network of individuals serving on the boards of big publicly held
firms does have that potential. We may expect that their incentives to mutually monitor each
other will not be pronounced. We still however lack, reliable studies on the efficiency and the
performance of our supervisory boards.
                                                       
36    Cf. Baums, The German Banking System and its Impact on Corporate Finance and Governance, in:
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       Working Paper Humboldt University, Dept. of Eonomics, 1998, 24 ff.
38    André, op. cit., at p. 1842.
39    André, op. cit., at p. 1840.13
6. The board at work
The supervisory board has a right to comprehensive information vis-à-vis the management
board (§ 90 Stock Corporation Act). This includes the annual auditor's report which must be
examined and commented by the board. In practice however, the auditor's report is as yet
delivered to the ordinary supervisory board members in only a minority of companies.
Most companies have certain important transactions and issues listed in their by-laws or a
separate set of rules of procedure as needing the supervisory board's approval. In general,
supervisory board consider as their main tasks the nomination of new management board
members, discussing and helping to develop the long-term corporate strategy and finance,
improving operational performance, and reviewing the management board's performance. To
what extent the supervisory board as a whole and its single members do contribute is open to
question, especially if one takes the rather infrequent meetings into account (4 times per year
for about 4 hours on average). Board committees will be convened more frequently, although
committees seem to be less widespread than, for instance, in US-companies.
The chairman of the supervisory board holds a particularly influential position which has even
been accentuated by the Co-determination Act of 1976: in the respective companies the
chairman has a tie-breaking vote.
As a general rule, the chairman stands in close contact with the management board. He can
influence the information available to the board and sets its agenda. A widely shared
assumption is that the Co-determination Act of 1976 has further reduced the board's intensity
of control and strengthened the position of the chairman.
VII. The Market for corporate control
The threat of an unwanted takeover can serve as a monitoring device provided that
management is not entrenched. The structural impediments and possible statutory
antitakeover provisions under German law have been described frequently
40. Apart from that,
                                                       
40    Lutter/Lammers, Hostile Takeovers: Possibilities and Limitations according to German law, in:
       Maeijer/Geens (eds.), Defensive Measures Against Hostile Takeovers in the Common Market, 1990,
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       Takeovers Through the Public Market – German Report with References to EC Law, in: Kozyris (ed.),14
public opinion and politicians are still opposed especially to public hostile takeover bids
whereas some of the big banks seem to have changed their minds. This became apparent
recently when Krupp-Hoesch AG tried to launch a public hostile takeover bid on the shares of
its larger competitor Thyssen AG. A public outburst of accusations against the bidder and the
banks involving employees, trade union representatives, politicians from all sides of the
political spectrum, the media and not least the target's management was its consequence.
Hence the bid was bogged down before it had started formally. That does not however, mean
that there are no hostile takeovers in Germany at all.
41 In closely held firms controlling blocks
will change hands irrespective of the obstruction of the incumbent management. But clocks in
big publicly held firms tick differently.
As to the regulation, there is no explicit statutory regulation of public takeovers in Germany.
In an attempt to modernize the financial market place in Germany a commission of experts
convened by the Ministry of Finance has developed rules concerning public takeover bids
42.
The provisions of this code are mere recommendations which are meant to be recognized
voluntarily by the stock exchange-listed companies. The majority of these companies has
however so far refused to do so.
The Social Democrats in the Federal Parliament have tabled a bill which provides  an explicit
statutory takeover regulation including a mandatory bid on all outstanding shares as soon as
an acquirer has purchased a controlling block
43. Statutory takeover regulation will become
necessary as soon as the EU Thirteenth Directive comes into force.
VIII.  Recent legislation
New legislation regarding corporate governance has been introduced recently. The Act on
Control and Transparency of Enterprises (KonTraG) entered into force on May 1, 1998.
44
Spurred by several spectacular company crises comprising inter alia, Metallgesellschaft AG,
and by discussion concerning the condition of the German economy, corporate governance
has become a field of legislative initiatives. It could, of course, not be expected that basic
                                                                                                                                                                            
       Corporate Takeovers Through the Public Markets, The Hague 1996, 191 ff.
41    Cf. Boehmer, op. cit. (n. 37).
42    See footnote 4 ), supra.
43    Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Regelung der Unternehmensübernahmen (Übernahmegesetz), BT-Drucksache
       13/8164 vom 2.7.1997.
44    Bundesgesetzblatt I vom 30.04.1998, 786 ff.15
structures (e.g. the two-tier system or codetermination) would be up for discussion. Therefore,
the KonTraG provides modest changes in details and does not mean a complete overhaul.
The aims of the KonTraG are the improvement of the work of the supervisory boards and
more transparency and strengthening of the shareholders´ position. Differences in voting
rights are reduced and obstacles to modern financing and salary instruments removed. Finally,
improving quality of auditing and a critical look at the role of the banks in corporate
governance is also part of the new legislation.
1.        Management´s duties, liability and pay
The KonTraG clarifies the duties of the management board. It is now explicitly provided that
there be an appropriate risk management. In particular, it is required to implement a
supervisory system in order to detect at an early stage developments which may endanger the
existence of the stock corporation.
Moreover, the annual accounts must identify the risks of future developments for the stock
corporation and, in the case of parent companies, the whole group. It is also set out in
somewhat more detail that the management board reports to the supervisory board on the
future business policy and, in particular, the planning relating to financial matters,
investments and personnel.
45
Enforcing the liability of the management has been made easier. If there is a strong suspicion
that the company has been damaged by dishonesty or infringement of the law the newly
established § 147 III Stock Corporation Act provides that shareholders holding 5 per cent of
the share capital or shares of an amount of one million German DM can demand that the
supervisory board or a special representative take action against managing directors.
 The KonTraG makes performance-oriented pay of the managers by granting stock options
easier. This incentive device was not previously frequently used in Germany as there were
technical impediments in the law. Now there are two new ways to satisfy an option contract
with the management. The company may either buy back shares on the market. Or it may
increase its share capital and create new stock on the condition that the stock options will
                                                       
45    Claussen, Wie ändert das KonTraG das Aktiengesetz ?, Der Betrieb 53, 1998, 177, 181;
       Hommelhoff/Mattheus, Corporate Governance nach dem KonTraG, Die Aktiengesellschaft 43, 1998,
       249, 252 ff.16
mature and be exercized.
46 The former more complicated way – granting management and
employees convertible bonds – will, of course, also remain viable in the future.
2.          Strengthening the supervisory board
Because of some spectacular insolvencies of stock corporations, the institution of the
supervisory board has become the subject of heated debate.
47 The contention even was that
the supervisory board is structurally incapable of or impeded in carrying out its main tasks.
One of the more specific complaints in this context is related to the maximum number of
memberships on supervisory boards that an individual may hold. Although the maximum
number has remained ten, it is now provided that the chairmanship of a supervisory board
counts double because of the time that is required to fulfil this task.
48
In order to allow the shareholders to scrutinize whether a candidate for the supervisory board
is capable of fulfilling the duties of a member of the supervisory board effectively and with no
conflicts of interest, appointment proposals for the position as a board member as well as the
corporations` annual accounts must identify the professional occupation of the (proposed)
member. Appointment proposals for members of the supervisory board of a listed stock
corporation should also identify that person´s membership of other supervisory boards and
similar bodies.
In order to improve efficiency of the supervisory board it is provided that it should meet once
a quarter and that it must meet once each half year, or, if the stock corporation is listed on a
stock exchange, twice each half year.
Substantial changes have also been made regarding the role of the supervisory board in
auditing. A copy of the auditor´s report must be delivered to each member of the supervisory
board or its corresponding committee. The supervisory board of a parent company must not
only scrutinize its own annual accounts, but also the consolidated accounts of the group.
                                                       
46    § 192 (1) no. 3 Stock Corporation Code.
47    See Adams,  Stellungnahme zur Aktienrechtsreform 1997, Die Aktiengesellschaft , Sonderheft – Die
       Aktienrechtsreform, 1997, 9 ff.; Baums, Stellungnahme zur Aktienrechtsreform 1997, Die Akti-
       engesellschaft, Sonderheft - Die Aktienrechtsreform, 1997, 26 ff.; Kübler, Stellungnahme zur Akti-
       enrechtsreform 1997, Die Aktiengesellschaft, Sonderheft – Die Aktienrechtsreform, 1997, 48 f.
48    Begründung des Regierungsentwurfes, BT-Drucksache 13/9712 vom 28.01.1998, p. 15 f.17
Finally, the auditor must attend the meeting of the supervisory board or its corresponding
committee in which the annual accounts are discussed.
49
3.          The role of the banks
 As mentioned above
50, banks have substantial influence on the exercise of voting rights in
publicly held stock corporations. This influence on German stock corporations was also the
subject of debate before the KonTraG entered into force.
51 The amendments made to the
Stock Corporation Act will however limit the position of banks in this respect only
marginally.
 In future, banks must inform customers whose shares they administer that they may choose to
have their voting rights exercised by the bank or by a shareholder association.
 In addition, a bank must inform its customers when it holds 5 % or more of the voting rights if
the company is listed or if the bank was a member of the company`s most recent underwriting
syndicate.
 Finally, the bank must also advise customers in the case that one of its managers or
employees is a member of the management or supervisory board of the respective stock
corporation.
 It is now clarified that banks must submit proposals on how to exercise the voting rights of
customers and that they must devise such proposals in accordance with the hypothetical
interests of an average customer. Furthermore, they must take organisational measures
ensuring that their own interests will not influence such proposals. In particular, a bank must
appoint a member of its management board who is responsible for compliance with the
aforementioned duties, and who must supervise the orderly exercise of the voting rights and
the recording thereof.
 A more substantial amendment is provided by the new § 135 I s. 3 AktG. According to this
provision a bank may not exercise the voting rights of its customers in stock corporations in
which it holds more than 5 % of the share capital, unless its has specific instructions from the
customer or it does not exercise its own voting rights.
52
                                                       
49    See Hommelhof/Mattheus, Corporate Governance nach dem KonTraG, Die Aktiengesellschaft 43, 1998,
       249, 254 ff.; Lingemann/Wasmann, Mehr Kontrolle und Transparenz im Aktienrecht: Das KonTraG tritt
       in Kraft, Der Betriebs-Berater 53, 1998, 853, 856 ff.
 
50    See VI. 5.
 
51    See footnote 36), supra.
52    Seibert, Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich, Die Aktienrechtsnovelle PRO und Kon-
       TraG, Die Aktiengesellschaft, Sonderheft – Die Aktienrechtsreform, 1997, 65, 68.18
 Finally, banks must disclose in their annual accounts all appointments of their employees and
managers to the mandatory boards of large corporate entities, such as stock corporations and
companies with limited liability, and all shareholdings in such corporate entities which exceed




4.          ”One share, one vote” and capital interlocks
According to the KonTraG German stock corporations may no longer create multiple voting
stock or caps on voting rights. There is a grandfather clause for existing caps and multiple
voting stock.
The abolition of multiple voting anticipates a similar provision in the Draft Proposal of a Fifth
Directive.
54 As with multiple voting stock, caps on voting rights (Hoechststimmrechte) are
also exposed to the objection that voting rights and ownership do not correlate.
55
A considerable number of stock corporations in Germany have provisions for maximum
voting rights in their by-laws. The main objective of such provisions has been the prevention
of hostile takeovers. As these may also be value-increasing, voting caps as a general
impediment were recognized as detrimental to the development of the capital market. The
legislation has therefore responded by abolishing maximum voting rights for listed stock
corporations.
56
Finally, the KonTraG lays down a further limitation of voting rights concerning interlocking
shareholdings. Such interlocks may create the danger of watering of capital stock and of
reducing ownership control.
 57 According to the new § 328 III AktG a listed stock corporation
                                                       
 
53    Claussen, Wie ändert das KonTraG das Aktiengesetz ?, Der Betrieb 53, 1998, 177, 183 ff.;
        Meyer-Wegner, New legislation reforms stock corporation rules, German Tax and Business Law News-
        Letter,  June 1998, 3, 4.
54    Zweite Änderung eines Vorschlags für eine Fünfte Richtlinie des Rates über die Struktur der AG,
       Abl.EG Nr. C 7 vom 11.01.1991.
55    Begründung des Regierungsentwurfs, BT-Drucksache, 13/9712, vom 28.01.1998, p. 20.
56    Hartenfels, Neuer rechtlicher Rahmen für Aktiengesellschaften, Die Bank, 1997, 182, 183; Lingemann/
       Wasmann, Mehr Kontrolle und Transparenz im Aktienrecht: Das KonTraG tritt in Kraft, Der Betriebs-
       Berater 53, 1998, 853, 854 f.
57    Begründung des Regierungsentwurfs, BT-Drucksache 13/9712 vom 28.01.1998, p. 25.19
is not allowed to exercise its voting rights as far as the election of supervisory board members
in the other company`s general meeting is concerned.
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